Current Affairs

Africa's Political Instability: Sahel and the Horn

Four countries made the news for the same reason between 2021 and 2023, a successful military coup, and Sudan's own coup in that wave is a different event entirely from the civil war it fell into two years later.

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Syllabus Prelims: Current eventsMains GS2: Bilateral, regional and global groupings

The Sahel's coup wave: one cause explains the pattern across three countries

The Sahel belt, including Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, has witnessed a wave of military coups since 2020: Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso twice in 2022, and Niger in 2023, each toppling an elected or civilian-led government. This is not a series of unrelated events; jihadist insurgencies, weak governance and economic distress are the shared drivers, and the coup wave is precisely what has produced the region's prolonged, ongoing political instability, a direct cause-and-effect relationship rather than a coincidence of timing across three neighbouring countries.

Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan together made international news between 2021 and 2023 for the same specific reason: each experienced a successful military coup in that window. Mali's 2020/2021 coups and Guinea's 2021 coup were direct military takeovers; Chad had a military-led transition after its president's death in 2021; and Sudan's military seized power in an October 2021 coup. Worth holding separately: Guinea's junta specifically suspended the Constitution after seizing power, a fact distinguishable from the other three countries' own coup circumstances.

Sudan's later civil war is a separate, subsequent event, not the same story as its 2021 coup. The 2021 coup installed a military government; a civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) then broke out separately in April 2023, nearly two years later, between what had until then been allied military factions. Treating "Sudan's coup" and "Sudan's civil war" as the same news event, rather than two chronologically distinct crises with the same underlying military actors, is a common and testable error.

Other 2021 political ruptures often grouped with the coup wave

Lebanon and Tunisia were in the news in the same period for reasons that resemble the coup wave but are not themselves military coups. Lebanon has been gripped by a prolonged economic and currency collapse since 2019, a financial and governance crisis rather than a military takeover. Tunisia's President suspended Parliament and assumed sweeping executive powers in 2021, a constitutional self-coup by a sitting civilian president rather than a military overthrow, worth distinguishing precisely from Guinea's and Sudan's military-led takeovers in the same broad period.

The Horn of Africa: refugee settlements and famine, correctly located

Bidibidi and Dadaab are two of the world's largest refugee settlements, frequently confused with each other in exactly the way a well-set question exploits. Bidibidi is located in Uganda, not Kenya, and primarily hosts refugees who fled the civil war in South Sudan. Dadaab, the settlement actually located in Kenya, hosts mostly Somali refugees. The two settlements sit in different countries and serve different refugee populations entirely; swapping either fact for the other is the trap.

Somalia was in the news in 2022-23 for facing one of its most severe famine risks in years, driven by its worst drought in over four decades, compounding decades of civil conflict and clan-based warfare and pushing parts of the country to the brink of a formally declared famine. Yemen, Chad and Mali have faced their own separate humanitarian crises, but the specific combination of protracted civil conflict and an acute drought-driven famine in this period belongs to Somalia.

Quick revision points

  • Sahel coup wave (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, since 2020): driven by jihadist insurgency, weak governance and economic distress; the coups are the direct cause of the region's ongoing instability.
  • Chad, Guinea, Mali, Sudan (2021-2023): all experienced a successful military coup in this window. Guinea's junta specifically suspended the Constitution.
  • Sudan's 2021 coup and its April 2023 civil war (army vs. the Rapid Support Forces) are two separate, sequential events, not one story.
  • Lebanon: prolonged economic/currency collapse (since 2019), not a coup. Tunisia: President's 2021 self-suspension of Parliament and executive-power grab, a constitutional rupture, not a military coup.
  • Bidibidi (Uganda, hosts South Sudanese refugees) and Dadaab (Kenya, hosts Somali refugees): commonly swapped, genuinely in different countries hosting different refugee populations.
  • Somalia: worst drought in 40+ years (2022-23), severe famine risk, compounding decades of civil/clan conflict.

Put it into practice

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