Environment

Project Elephant, Barasingha and Cheetah Revival

Project Elephant's real numbers, Kanha's barasingha recovery, why musk deer are poached, and Kuno's cheetah reintroduction, successes and setbacks both.

13 min readCovers: Shankar IAS, Environment · Wildlife, Elephant Conservation

A question on this chapter once tested something most aspirants get wrong by assumption rather than ignorance: the cheetahs walking around Kuno National Park today are not the same subspecies that went extinct in India. The Indian, or Asiatic, cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus venaticus) was declared extinct in the country in 1952. The cheetahs flown in from Namibia and South Africa from 2022 onward are the Southeast African cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus jubatus), a genetically distinct subspecies that a 2020 ancient-DNA study found diverged from the Indian lineage tens of thousands of years ago. Strictly, Kuno is hosting an "introduction" of an ecological replacement, not a "reintroduction" of the lost population, a distinction examiners like to test precisely because the popular press never bothers with it. This note covers four separately tested, name-specific conservation efforts: Project Elephant, the Kanha barasingha's recovery, the threatened musk deer, and species translocation as a technique, using the cheetah project as the worked example.

Project Elephant and human-elephant conflict

Project Elephant was launched by the Government of India in 1992 as a centrally sponsored scheme of the (then) Ministry of Environment and Forests, run parallel to but separately from Project Tiger. Its stated objectives are threefold: to protect elephants, their habitat and their migratory corridors; to address the problem of human-elephant conflict; and to look after the welfare of captive elephants. Unlike Project Tiger, Project Elephant never received its own dedicated chapter of statutory backing inside the Wild Life (Protection) Act; it functions as an administrative, financial and technical support scheme to elephant-range States rather than as a body with the enforcement powers NTCA holds for tigers.

Per the Ministry's own count as of December 2023, India has 33 Elephant Reserves spread across 14 major elephant-bearing States, together covering roughly 80,778 sq km. Separately, the Ministry, working with State Forest Departments, has ground-validated 150 elephant corridors across 15 elephant-range States. This is a larger, more current figure than the number most study material still quotes: the Wildlife Trust of India's Right of Passage report, the landmark mapping exercise behind the corridor concept, had identified 101 corridors in its second edition. Both figures are correct for their stated date; the gap is a validation exercise catching up with the original survey, not a contradiction, and it is worth remembering that corridor counts, like tiger reserve counts, are revised over time and should be treated as accurate to the date cited.

Human-elephant conflict (HEC) is the sharpest edge of this chapter. Government data for the three years to 2022-23 shows human deaths from elephant encounters rising, not falling: 461 deaths in 2020-21, 535 in 2021-22, and 605 in 2022-23. Odisha recorded the highest toll in 2022-23 at 148 deaths, followed by West Bengal (97) and Assam (80). This matters for the exam because a common wrong assumption is that HEC is a marginal, localised problem; the trend line says the opposite, and it is a large part of why "conflict" sits inside Project Elephant's own name as a core objective, not an afterthought.

The standard mitigation toolkit, drawn from the same government material, includes: securing and legally acquiring land inside identified corridors using CAMPA funds, so elephant movement routes are not lost to encroachment; technology-based early-warning systems that alert villages ahead of an approaching herd; crop-damage compensation and ex-gratia payments to affected families; and relocating villages out of high-conflict zones where feasible. On the awareness side, the Ministry and the Wildlife Trust of India launched the Gaj Yatra campaign on World Elephant Day, 12 August 2017, a roadshow that moved through 12 elephant-range States over 15 months to build local support for corridor protection, the same underlying logic as Project Tiger's core and buffer zones: conservation only holds where the people living beside the animal are part of the plan, not excluded from it.

One further, very current data point worth knowing: India's first DNA-based elephant census (the All-India Synchronous Elephant Estimation, released in October 2025) put the population at 22,446, against roughly 27,000-30,000 under the older, non-DNA methodology used in 2017. Officials have been careful to note the two counts are not strictly comparable because the counting method itself changed (dung-based DNA fingerprinting versus indirect sign counts), so treat the headline "decline" figure with that caveat rather than as a clean like-for-like drop.

The Barasingha: a conservation success story

The barasingha, or swamp deer (Rucervus duvaucelii), exists in India as three distinct populations usually treated as separate subspecies: the wetland barasingha of the Terai belt (Dudhwa and the upper Gangetic plains), the eastern barasingha of Kaziranga's floodplains, and the hard-ground barasingha (Rucervus duvaucelii branderi), the only one of the three adapted to firm, well-drained grassland rather than swamp. The hard-ground subspecies survives nowhere else in the world except Kanha National Park in Madhya Pradesh, which makes Kanha's management of this single population the entire global conservation effort for the subspecies.

That population came close to disappearing entirely. By 1970, hunting, habitat loss and disease from unregulated cattle grazing had reduced it to an estimated 66 animals in Kanha, the lowest point in its recorded history. Recovery came from roughly five decades of sustained, unglamorous habitat management rather than any single dramatic intervention: around 35 forest villages were relocated out of Kanha's core to expand usable grassland habitat, degraded grassland and swamp patches were actively restored, livestock grazing was restricted to cut disease transmission, and vulnerable fawns were protected in enclosures during the calving season. By Kanha Tiger Reserve's own current figures, the population now stands at roughly 1,000 to 1,050 animals, confined to the reserve's core zone. It is one of the genuinely rare cases in Indian wildlife conservation where a subspecies was pulled back from low double digits to four figures within a single human lifetime, and it is why Shankar IAS-style material flags Kanha specifically rather than just "barasingha conservation" in general.

Because the entire hard-ground population still lives in one park, it remains vulnerable to a single disease outbreak, fire or catastrophic event wiping out the subspecies at a stroke. Since 2015, conservators have begun translocating a share of Kanha's surplus animals to Satpura Tiger Reserve, and more recently to Bandhavgarh Tiger Reserve, both also in Madhya Pradesh, specifically to establish additional, geographically separate breeding populations and reduce that single-site risk. The IUCN lists the barasingha as Vulnerable with a declining overall population trend across its Indian range even as the hard-ground subspecies in Kanha itself has recovered, a reminder that a local success story and a species-wide Red List status can point in different directions at the same time. The barasingha is also the state animal of Madhya Pradesh.

The musk deer and the poaching threat

The musk deer found across India's high Himalaya (Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, referred to loosely as the Himalayan musk deer, genus Moschus) lives in the alpine and subalpine zone, typically between roughly 3,000 and 4,500 metres, feeding on lichens, mosses and dwarf rhododendron in terrain too cold and steep for most other deer. It is a small, solitary, largely nocturnal animal, and unlike almost every other species covered in this note, the entire threat to its survival comes down to one anatomical feature: only the adult male carries a musk pod, a glandular sac whose waxy secretion has been prized for over a thousand years in perfumery and in traditional medicine across Asia, and which has historically commanded prices among the highest of any animal product by weight. That value is precisely why poaching, not habitat loss, is the dominant threat: a poacher only needs to kill one male to obtain the pod, but has no way to identify sex from a distance, so hunting pressure falls on the whole population indiscriminately.

India gives the musk deer its strongest possible legal protection: it is listed in Schedule I, Part I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (entry 25, "Musk deer"), the same tier of protection as the tiger, meaning hunting is banned outright and trade in any part of the animal is a non-bailable offence. The IUCN lists the Himalayan musk deer as Endangered. India's flagship protected area for the species is the Kedarnath Wildlife Sanctuary in Uttarakhand, also popularly called the Kedarnath Musk Deer Sanctuary, notified in 1972 specifically because of the alarming decline in the local musk deer population from poaching; at roughly 975 sq km it is the largest protected area in the western Himalaya.

Here is the honest part examiners increasingly probe, and where this note departs from the usual "sanctuary was set up, problem solved" framing. Kedarnath's own captive breeding centre, set up at Kanchula Kharak in 1982 with the explicit aim of breeding musk deer to relieve pressure on the wild population, did not succeed: the animals in the enclosure died from various causes over time, and the sole survivor was eventually transferred out to a zoo in Darjeeling. A 2024 assessment by the Central Zoo Authority found that none of India's recognised zoos currently hold any musk deer at all, that three separate breeding centres set up over the years (at Kufri, Almora and Chamoli, in addition to Kedarnath) all failed to establish a viable population, and that India does not presently even hold the founder breeding stock needed to restart a captive programme. In short: legal protection for the musk deer is strong on paper, the flagship sanctuary exists and is real, but the captive breeding leg of the conservation effort has, to date, not worked, in contrast to countries such as China, which run functioning musk deer breeding and non-lethal musk-extraction programmes. Anti-poaching patrols and community awareness work in the wild population continue regardless of the breeding centres' failure.

Species translocation: the cheetah reintroduction

Translocation, as a conservation tool, means the deliberate, human-assisted movement of a species from one location to another, either within its historic range (to re-establish a population where it has been locally lost, or to found a new breeding population and spread extinction risk, exactly the logic behind moving Kanha's barasingha to Satpura and Bandhavgarh above) or, more controversially, into an area outside its documented historic range as an ecological substitute. The IUCN's own guidelines on the subject set out that any such move needs strong evidence that the original cause of decline has actually been removed, not just that the destination habitat currently looks suitable.

India's highest-profile translocation is Project Cheetah at Kuno National Park, Madhya Pradesh. As the opening of this note sets out, the Asiatic cheetah went extinct in India by 1952; the animals now at Kuno are the Southeast African cheetah, brought in under an Action Plan finalised in January 2022. The first batch, eight cheetahs (five female, three male) from Namibia, arrived and were released on 17 September 2022. A second batch of 12 cheetahs from South Africa followed in February 2023. A third, smaller batch from Botswana arrived in early 2026, with releases into the park continuing through the year; across all batches, roughly 29 cheetahs have been brought in from abroad to date, and a second release site, Gandhi Sagar Wildlife Sanctuary, also in Madhya Pradesh, has since been brought into the project.

The project has not been a clean success story, and this note will not pretend otherwise. A cluster of adult deaths in 2023, several linked to septicaemia from wounds where radio collars had chafed the skin during the humid monsoon, along with cub deaths in the same period, drew national attention and Supreme Court scrutiny. The NTCA's own preliminary position, stated in a July 2023 release, was that the deaths investigated to that point were attributable to natural causes rather than any single design flaw, and it explicitly cautioned against reading too much into early results, pointing out that historical cheetah reintroductions elsewhere in Africa have often seen first-year mortality above 50%. A subsequent external review still led to real course corrections: redesigned collars with shorter, softer bands, a slower pace of releasing cheetahs from enclosures into the open, and monsoon-specific veterinary protocols. By 2026, the population, boosted by cubs born on Indian soil to the original founders, had recovered into the mid-to-high fifties across both sites, a genuine sign of ecological viability. At the same time, field officials continue to report a separate, ongoing problem: some individual cheetahs repeatedly wander beyond Kuno's boundary into Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, forcing repeated tranquilisation and recapture, itself flagged as a health risk to the animal. The fair summary, and the one this note commits to, is that Project Cheetah is a qualified, still-unfolding effort: real population growth and real institutional learning from early mistakes, alongside a genuine, unresolved mortality and range-management problem, not the simple triumph or the simple failure that either side of the public debate tends to claim.

Why this is tested

This chapter rewards knowing the specific, sometimes uncomfortable details rather than the clean textbook headline. Examiners like the cheetah subspecies trap covered at the start, because "reintroduction" is the word used everywhere in the popular press even though the correct technical term for what happened at Kuno is closer to an introduction of an ecological replacement. They also like flipping which programme is older: Project Tiger (1973) is frequently assumed to be the template that Project Elephant (1992) simply copied nearly two decades later, when in fact Project Elephant never received the equivalent of NTCA's statutory backing and still runs as a support scheme, not a statutory authority. A third recurring trap swaps the barasingha's subspecies: only the hard-ground barasingha is confined to Kanha; the wetland and eastern barasingha survive in the Terai and in Kaziranga respectively, and a question naming the wrong location for the wrong subspecies is a frequent statement-based construction. A fourth tests whether a candidate knows that a sanctuary being notified is not the same as a conservation measure working: Kedarnath exists and gives the musk deer real legal protection, but its captive breeding programme is a documented failure, not a quiet success nobody talks about. Numbers in this space (elephant reserve counts, corridor counts, cheetah population, HEC death tolls) are all revised year to year; treat any specific figure here as accurate to its stated date and verify the current number closer to your exam.

Quick revision points

  • Project Elephant: launched 1992, objectives are protecting elephants/habitat/corridors, addressing human-elephant conflict, and captive elephant welfare. No NTCA-style statutory authority of its own.
  • India (as of December 2023): 33 Elephant Reserves in 14 States (~80,778 sq km); 150 elephant corridors ground-validated across 15 States (up from WTI's earlier 101-corridor count).
  • HEC deaths rose year on year: 461 (2020-21) to 605 (2022-23); Odisha, West Bengal and Assam are the worst-affected States. Gaj Yatra (launched 12 August 2017) is the flagship awareness campaign.
  • First DNA-based elephant census (October 2025): population 22,446, not directly comparable to older, non-DNA counts due to methodology change.
  • Hard-ground barasingha (Rucervus duvaucelii branderi): found only in Kanha National Park; collapsed to 66 animals by 1970, recovered to roughly 1,000-1,050 today; also being translocated to Satpura and Bandhavgarh to spread extinction risk. Barasingha overall is IUCN Vulnerable; it is Madhya Pradesh's state animal.
  • Musk deer: alpine Himalaya, roughly 3,000-4,500 m; poached only for the male's musk pod; Schedule I under the WLPA, 1972; IUCN Endangered. Kedarnath Wildlife Sanctuary (1972) is India's flagship musk deer protected area, but its 1982 captive breeding centre failed, and India currently has no confirmed musk deer in any zoo and no founder stock to restart breeding.
  • Translocation = deliberate human-assisted movement of a species to found or reinforce a population. Project Cheetah at Kuno National Park: Southeast African cheetahs (not the extinct Asiatic subspecies), from Namibia (8, September 2022) and South Africa (12, February 2023), later Botswana; a 2023 mortality cluster triggered real course corrections; population had recovered into the mid-to-high fifties by 2026, alongside an ongoing boundary-crossing problem.

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