Central Vigilance Commission: From a 1964 Resolution to the CVC Act, 2003

The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) is this book's best example of a body that changed category: it began as a non-statutory, executive body and became statutory only decades later, and knowing exactly when and why that happened is most of what this chapter tests.

From a 1964 resolution to a 2003 Act

The CVC was originally set up by a plain Government of India resolution dated 11 February 1964, on the recommendation of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption, making it a purely non-statutory, executive body for nearly four decades. That changed only after Vineet Narain v Union of India (1997), the Hawala case, in which the Supreme Court, concerned that anti-corruption oversight sat too close to executive control, directed that the CVC be given statutory status and made the supervising authority over the CBI's anti-corruption investigations. Parliament responded first with an ordinance in 1998, and then with the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, which finally gave the CVC statutory backing. A statement asserting "the CVC has always been a statutory body" is a specific, recurring wrong answer for exactly this reason.

Composition and appointment

The Commission consists of a Central Vigilance Commissioner and not more than two Vigilance Commissioners, appointed by the President on the recommendation of a three-member committee: the Prime Minister (Chairperson), the Union Home Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. This three-member structure, built around named political office holders rather than a wider search process, is worth contrasting directly with the Lokpal's own five-member Selection Committee (Prime Minister, Speaker, Leader of the Opposition, the Chief Justice of India or a nominee, and an eminent jurist), since both bodies exist to insulate anti-corruption oversight from ordinary executive control but use different appointing panels.

What the CVC actually does

The CVC's core role is advisory and supervisory rather than prosecutorial: it does not itself investigate or prosecute corruption cases, but exercises superintendence over the vigilance administration of central government ministries and departments, and, since the CVC Act, 2003, over the Delhi Special Police Establishment (the CBI) so far as it relates to investigation of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It also reviews the progress of investigations the CBI conducts into corruption allegations against public servants and can direct the CBI to investigate a corruption complaint. It does not have its own investigating police force; its authority operates through this supervisory relationship with the CBI and departmental vigilance machinery, not through independent prosecution.

Quick revision points

• 1964: set up by a plain Government of India resolution, on the Santhanam Committee's recommendation, non-statutory, executive body.
• Vineet Narain v Union of India (1997): Supreme Court directs statutory status and CBI supervision; a 1998 ordinance followed.
• CVC Act, 2003: gives the CVC statutory status for the first time. "Always statutory" is a common, wrong distractor.
• Composition: 1 Central Vigilance Commissioner + up to 2 Vigilance Commissioners, appointed by the President on the recommendation of a 3-member committee: PM (Chair), Home Minister, Leader of the Opposition (Lok Sabha).
• Role: superintendence over central vigilance administration and, since the 2003 Act, over the CBI's anti-corruption investigations; advisory and supervisory, not itself a prosecuting or investigating agency.

The category-change fact (non-statutory 1964, statutory only from 2003) is the single most reliable question this chapter produces; hold the two dates and what happened at each one rather than treating "statutory" as always having been true.