Comptroller and Auditor General of India: Articles 148-151 and the 1971 Act

The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) audits the accounts of the Union and every state, and is one of this book's cleanest examples of a constitutional body (Article 148) whose actual working detail Parliament, not the Constitution, was left to fill in.

Appointment and removal (Article 148)

Article 148 has the President appoint the CAG by warrant under his hand and seal, and can only be removed in like manner and on the like grounds as a Supreme Court Judge: a two-thirds special majority impeachment for proved misbehaviour or incapacity, not by any simpler executive process. This removal protection, identical to a Supreme Court judge's, is what makes the CAG's independence from the executive it audits constitutionally real rather than a matter of convention.

Duties and powers: prescribed by Parliament, not the article itself

Article 149 does not itself list what the CAG actually audits; it instead authorises Parliament to prescribe the CAG's duties and powers by law. Parliament did so in the Comptroller and Auditor General's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971 (the "DPC Act"), whose Chapter III carries the CAG's substantive functions, including compiling and auditing the accounts of the Union and the states. The practical consequence worth knowing: unlike, say, the Election Commission, whose core constitutional function (Article 324) is stated directly, the CAG's real job description lives in an ordinary statute that Parliament could in principle amend, even though the office itself cannot be abolished without amending the Constitution.

Form of accounts and audit reports (Articles 150 and 151)

Article 150 has the accounts of the Union and the states kept in whatever form the President prescribes on the CAG's own advice, so the CAG shapes the very format its own later audits will be run against. Article 151 requires the CAG's audit reports on the Union's accounts to go to the President, who lays them before Parliament, and reports on a state's accounts to go to that state's Governor, laid before the state legislature; Parliament and the state legislatures then examine these reports, typically through their own Public Accounts Committees.

Term and post-retirement restriction

The CAG's term, six years or until the age of 65, whichever comes earlier, is fixed by the DPC Act, 1971, since Article 148(3) itself only says salary and conditions of service are for Parliament to determine by law. The bar on future office, though, is in the Constitution itself, not the Act: Article 148(4) states plainly that the CAG "shall not be eligible for further office either under the Government of India or under the Government of any State" after ceasing to hold the post, a restriction meant to remove any incentive to soften an audit finding in hope of a future government appointment.

Quick revision points

• Article 148: appointed by the President, removable only like a Supreme Court Judge (impeachment, not ordinary executive action).
• Article 149: the CAG's real duties and powers are not in the article itself, they are in the CAG's (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971, made under this article's own authorisation.
• Article 150: accounts format set by the President, on the CAG's advice.
• Article 151: Union audit reports go to the President; state audit reports go to the Governor of that state; each is laid before the relevant legislature.
• Term: 6 years or age 65, whichever is earlier (fixed by the 1971 Act). No further government office after leaving is in Article 148(4) itself, not the Act.

The chapter's real trap is treating Article 149 as if it were self-contained; know that its content is delegated to the 1971 Act, since a question can test either the article number or the Act by name for the identical fact.