Landmark Judgements and Their Impact: A Chronological Index

Rather than re-deriving the roughly two dozen landmark judgements this site's other Polity notes already cover in real depth, most citing the case in the specific chapter its holding actually belongs to, this chapter's own job is different: to lay every one of them out in chronological order, so a candidate can see how one case answers, extends, or overturns another, a connection that is easy to miss when each case is met only once, inside a single unrelated chapter.

The chronology

1950, A.K. Gopalan v State of Madras (this site's Supreme Court note): an early, narrow reading of Article 21, "procedure established by law" needs only a valid procedure, not a fair one. This reading held for nearly three decades.

1955, Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v State of Madhya Pradesh (this site's Fundamental Rights note): source of the doctrine of eclipse, a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with Part III is not dead, only eclipsed, and revives if the inconsistency is removed by a later amendment.

1957, State of Bombay v R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (this site's Doctrines note): established the doctrine of territorial nexus, letting a state law reach beyond its own borders where a sufficient connection exists.

1967, Golaknath v State of Punjab (this site's Amendment of the Constitution and Doctrines notes): held Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights, and did so using the doctrine of prospective overruling, applied in Indian law for the first time, so the ruling bound only future amendments, leaving past ones untouched.

1973, Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (this site's Concept of the Constitution and Supreme Court notes): the single most consequential case in the whole syllabus, overruling Golaknath's absolute bar but holding Parliament's amending power, though it reaches every part of the Constitution, cannot alter the basic structure. This one 7:6 holding is the doctrine nearly every later case on this list either applies or is tested against.

1975, Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain (this site's Basic Structure note): the basic structure doctrine's first real-world application, striking down a constitutional amendment that had tried to place the Prime Minister's own election beyond judicial review, holding free and fair elections and judicial review themselves to be part of the basic structure.

1978, Maneka Gandhi v Union of India (this site's Fundamental Rights and Supreme Court notes): overturned A.K. Gopalan's own narrow reading, holding "procedure established by law" under Article 21 must itself be fair, just, and reasonable, not merely enacted through a valid process.

1980, Minerva Mills v Union of India (this site's Supreme Court note, among others): struck down 42nd Amendment clauses that tried to place constitutional amendments beyond judicial review altogether, holding that judicial review, and a harmonious balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, are themselves part of the basic structure.

1981, S.P. Gupta v Union of India (the First Judges Case, this site's Supreme Court note): read judicial "consultation" narrowly, giving the executive the upper hand in judicial appointments, a position the Second and Third Judges Cases later reversed.

1992, Indra Sawhney v Union of India (this site's Fundamental Rights note): the Mandal Commission case, source of the 50% ceiling on reservations and the creamy layer exclusion for OBCs, and struck down reservation in promotions under the original Article 16(4), prompting the 77th Amendment.

1992, Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu (this site's Parliament and Tenth Schedule coverage): upheld the Tenth Schedule's Anti-Defection Law itself as constitutional, but struck down, 3:2, the paragraph that had tried to exclude judicial review of a Speaker's own disqualification decisions.

1994, S.R. Bommai v Union of India (this site's Emergency Provisions, Federal System, and Salient Features notes): the leading case on Article 356, holding that a government's majority must be tested on the floor of the House, not by the Governor's own personal assessment, and that a President's Rule proclamation itself is subject to judicial review.

1997, Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (this site's Judicial Activism note): laid down binding workplace sexual-harassment guidelines under Article 141 in a total legislative vacuum, until the 2013 Act superseded them, the clean example of activism filling a genuine gap.

1997, L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (this site's Tribunals note): restored High Court oversight of tribunal orders, striking down the original scheme that had let tribunals exclude High Court jurisdiction entirely.

2002, Indian National Congress v Institute of Social Welfare (this site's Political Parties note): narrowed the Election Commission's power to deregister a party to fraud, loss of constitutional allegiance, or a comparably serious ground.

2013, PUCL v Union of India (this site's Electoral Reforms note): directed the Election Commission to introduce NOTA, grounding the right to express no preference in Article 19(1)(a).

2013, Lily Thomas v Union of India (this site's Election Laws note): struck down the three-month grace period that had let a convicted sitting MP or MLA keep their seat pending appeal.

2015, SCAORA v Union of India (the NJAC case, this site's Supreme Court note): struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission as incompatible with judicial independence, a basic structure feature, restoring the collegium.

2017, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (this site's Fundamental Rights note): a nine-judge bench held the right to privacy is intrinsic to Article 21.

2021, Union of India v Rajendra N. Shah (this site's Co-operative Societies note): struck down the 97th Amendment's Part IXB for state-level co-operatives specifically, for lacking the state-legislature ratification Article 368(2)'s proviso required.

2022, Union of India v Mohit Minerals (this site's Federal System note): held GST Council recommendations are advisory, not binding on Parliament or a state legislature.

2023, Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India (this site's Union Territories note): gave Delhi's government legislative and executive control over "services," the subject Article 239AA's own exclusion list does not name.

2024, Association for Democratic Reforms v Union of India (this site's Electoral Reforms note): struck down the Electoral Bond Scheme as unconstitutional, violating a voter's right to information under Article 19(1)(a).

2025, Madras Bar Association v Union of India (this site's Tribunals note): struck down the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021's appointment and tenure provisions as undermining judicial independence, directing a National Tribunals Commission within four months.

The pattern worth naming

Read in order rather than in isolation, this list traces one durable, recurring conflict: the judiciary treating its own power of review, and constitutional structures that safeguard genuine independence from the executive, as beyond the reach of an ordinary amendment or an ordinary statute. Kesavananda (1973), Minerva Mills (1980), Kihoto Hollohan (1992), SCAORA (2015), L. Chandra Kumar (1997), and Madras Bar Association (2025) are the same argument, made across five decades, against five different attempts to limit judicial review or judicial independence by ordinary legislative or constitutional means.

Each case above is covered with its full facts, reasoning, and citation in the note named beside it; this chapter's own value is holding the sequence, not repeating the detail.