State Legislature: the Assembly, the Council, and Why the Council Is Genuinely Weaker

A State Legislature looks, at first glance, like Parliament scaled down: a lower House, sometimes an upper House, a Speaker, sessions, Bills. This site's Parliament note already covers that shared architecture in depth. What it does not cover, because it belongs here, is where the state-level version genuinely diverges: a Legislative Council that Parliament can abolish by ordinary law, a composition formula with exact fractions UPSC likes to scramble, and an override mechanism that makes the Council a real, working example of an upper House with less power than the Rajya Sabha, not just a smaller one. This chapter has produced exactly two real Prelims questions so far, 2019-gs1-q43 (on the Governor's customary address and a State Legislature's fallback procedural rules) and 2018-gs1-q39 (on exactly when a Speaker vacates office), and both sit squarely inside the material below.

This chapter's material overlaps with NCERT Class 11, Indian Constitution at Work, Chapter 5 (Legislature). This note goes further than that chapter's coverage.

Article 168: one Legislature, one or two Houses

Article 168(1) says every State has a Legislature consisting of the Governor and either one House or two. Where there are two, the upper House is called the Legislative Council and the lower the Legislative Assembly; where there is only one, it is the Legislative Assembly. The name is a standing exam trap: a state's Legislative Council has nothing to do with the Council of States, which is the Rajya Sabha's formal name under Article 80. They are unrelated institutions that happen to share a word.

Which states are currently bicameral is exactly the kind of fact that goes stale, so it is worth being precise rather than reciting a remembered number. As of this note, six states have a Legislative Council: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Telangana and Uttar Pradesh. This is confirmed by PRS Legislative Research's own current tracking of state Councils, and the amendment history printed in the Ministry of Law and Justice's own text of Article 168 tells the story behind the number: Andhra Pradesh's Council was abolished in 1985 and recreated only in 2007; Punjab's was abolished in 1970 and West Bengal's in 1969; Tamil Nadu's was abolished in 1986, and a 2010 Act to revive it was never actually notified into force, so it still does not exist in practice. Telangana's entry replaced Tamil Nadu's position in the article following the 2014 bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh. Madhya Pradesh is the sharpest trap of all: the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 provided for an MP Legislative Council, but the notification bringing it into effect was never issued, so Madhya Pradesh has remained unicameral in practice for its entire history despite the textual provision. Anyone reciting "commonly six states" without checking the current, live list is one Parliament debate away from being wrong; the AP abolition attempt below is exactly why.

Article 169: creating or abolishing a Council, a real asymmetry with the Rajya Sabha

This is the most genuinely interesting mechanism in the chapter. Under Article 169(1), Parliament may by law abolish an existing Legislative Council, or create one where none exists, but only if the State Legislative Assembly first passes a resolution to that effect, and that resolution needs a special majority: a majority of the Assembly's total membership, and not less than two-thirds of members present and voting. Once that resolution passes, Parliament is free to legislate, and crucially, Article 169(3) says such a law is not treated as a constitutional amendment for the purposes of Article 368, so it needs no special parliamentary majority and no state ratification, an ordinary law is enough.

Compare this with the Rajya Sabha. The Rajya Sabha is a continuing body under Article 83(1) and cannot be abolished by any law, ordinary or otherwise; only a formal constitutional amendment could touch its existence, and even that would run into serious basic-structure questions. A state Legislative Council, by contrast, exists entirely at the sufferance of its own Assembly and Parliament acting together. This is not a hypothetical: in July 2020 the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly actually passed the Article 169 resolution to abolish its own Council, after the TDP-dominated Council referred the state's capital Bills to a select committee. The abolition Bill was never taken up by Parliament, and the Council has continued to function since, including holding elections for eight of its members in March 2025. West Bengal runs the debate in the opposite direction: having abolished its Council in 1969, there have been repeated, unsuccessful pushes to recreate one. Both cases show the same thing, a Council's survival is a live political and parliamentary question in a way the Rajya Sabha's never is.

Article 170: sizing the Legislative Assembly

Article 170(1) fixes the Legislative Assembly of each State at not more than 500 and not less than 60 members, directly elected from territorial constituencies, with clause (2) requiring the population-to-seats ratio to stay as uniform as practicable across the state. Seat totals and boundaries stay frozen against the 1971 census (readjusted only on the 2001 figures for delimitation) until the first census after 2026 is published, the same freeze the Lok Sabha's own seat allocation carries, and for the same reason: not to penalise states that controlled population growth with a shrinking legislative share.

Article 171: the Legislative Council's composition, precisely

This is the formula UPSC likes to test because it is easy to misstate. Article 171(1) caps a Council's total strength at not more than one-third of the Assembly's membership, with a floor of not less than 40. Article 171(3) then splits that total into five categories:

• (a) one-third, elected by municipalities, district boards and other local authorities specified by Parliament;
• (b) one-twelfth, elected by graduates of at least three years' standing;
• (c) one-twelfth, elected by teachers of at least three years' standing in institutions not lower than secondary school;
• (d) one-third, elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly itself, from among persons who are not members of the Assembly; and
• (e) the remainder, nominated by the Governor, from persons with special knowledge or practical experience in literature, science, art, the co-operative movement, or social service.

Add the fixed fractions and the arithmetic resolves the common confusion: one-third plus one-twelfth plus one-twelfth plus one-third comes to five-sixths, which leaves exactly one-sixth for the Governor's nominees. So the formula is genuinely 1/3 (local bodies), 1/12 (graduates), 1/12 (teachers), 1/3 (MLA-elected), and 1/6 (Governor's nominees), not the various reordered or rounded versions that circulate. Elections under (a), (b) and (c) use territorial constituencies fixed by Parliament; the MLA-elected seats under (d) use the single transferable vote, the same proportional-representation method used to elect the Rajya Sabha and the President.

Article 172: five years for the Assembly, permanence for the Council

The Legislative Assembly's term is five years from the date of its first meeting, unless dissolved sooner; expiry of the term operates as automatic dissolution. During a Proclamation of Emergency, Parliament may extend this by law, one year at a time, but never beyond six months after the Emergency ends.

The Legislative Council, like the Rajya Sabha, is not subject to dissolution. Instead, as nearly as possible one-third of its members retire at the end of every second year, under rules Parliament makes by law, giving it the same rolling, continuous character as the Union's upper House.

The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Assembly: a near-exact mirror

Every Legislative Assembly chooses two of its own members, under Article 178, to be Speaker and Deputy Speaker, by simple majority; there is no separate election machinery beyond that. Removal, under Article 179, follows the same higher bar as the Lok Sabha Speaker: a resolution passed by a majority of all the then members of the Assembly, with at least 14 days' notice. And exactly as at the Union level, when the Assembly is dissolved the Speaker does not vacate office immediately, but continues "until immediately before the first meeting" of the newly constituted Assembly, so the chair is never empty. This is precisely the rule the 2018 PYQ tests: a Speaker who ceases to be an Assembly member does vacate office at once, but a Speaker does not vacate the instant the Assembly is dissolved. On this particular point there is no real state-specific divergence from the Lok Sabha Speaker worth hunting for; Articles 178-180 are close to a verbatim copy of Articles 93-94, right down to the finality of the Speaker's Money Bill certification under Article 199(3), which mirrors the Lok Sabha Speaker's Article 110(3) power exactly.

The Chairman of the Legislative Council: the one place a real asymmetry with the Rajya Sabha shows up

Here the parallel with the Union breaks in a way worth remembering. The Rajya Sabha's presiding officer is not one of its own elected members at all: the Vice President of India is its ex officio Chairman under Article 89. A state Legislative Council has no equivalent outside figure. Under Article 182, the Council elects its own Chairman and Deputy Chairman from among its members, the same way the Assembly elects its Speaker, and removes them the same way too (Article 183): a resolution of a majority of all the then members, with 14 days' notice. So while the Assembly-Speaker relationship mirrors the Lok Sabha almost exactly, the Council-Chairman relationship does not mirror the Rajya Sabha at all; it is structurally closer to how the Assembly elects its own Speaker.

Sessions, prorogation and dissolution: largely Parliament's pattern, run by the Governor

Article 174 gives the Governor the same summoning power the President holds over Parliament (Article 85): the House or Houses must meet "from time to time," with the same binding constraint that six months must not intervene between sessions. The Governor may also prorogue either House and dissolve the Assembly; the Council, being permanent, cannot be dissolved.

Article 176 requires the Governor to address the Assembly, or, where there is a Council, both Houses together, at the start of the first session after each general election and at the start of the first session of every year, exactly the fact confirmed correct in the 2019 PYQ. Where a House has not framed its own rules on a procedural point, Article 208(2) falls back on the rules and standing orders that governed the corresponding Provincial Legislature immediately before the Constitution commenced, and in practice a House with no rule of its own on a given matter typically follows the Lok Sabha's corresponding procedure, again the exact convention tested as correct in that same PYQ.

Legislative procedure for ordinary Bills: where the Council is genuinely weaker

Under Article 196, a Bill (other than a Money Bill) may originate in either House of a bicameral Legislature and is deemed passed only once both Houses agree, without amendment or with amendments both accept. A Bill pending anywhere in the Legislature survives prorogation. A Bill still pending in the Council, not yet passed by the Assembly, survives the Assembly's dissolution; but a Bill pending in the Assembly, or passed by the Assembly and still pending in the Council, lapses on the Assembly's dissolution, the same lapsing pattern Parliament follows under Article 107.

Article 197 is the article that actually separates a state Council from the Rajya Sabha. If, after the Assembly passes an ordinary Bill and sends it to the Council, the Council rejects it, or more than three months pass without the Council acting on it, or the Council passes it with amendments the Assembly will not accept, the Assembly may simply pass the Bill again, in the same or a later session, incorporating whatever of the Council's suggestions it chooses, and send it back. If, the second time, the Council again rejects it, or more than one month passes without action, or it again amends the Bill unacceptably, the Bill is deemed to have been passed by both Houses, in the form the Assembly passed it the second time. No joint sitting, no further vote by the Council is required or possible.

This is the real, testable asymmetry the exam keeps circling back to. The Rajya Sabha's position on an ordinary Bill is co-equal with the Lok Sabha's: if the Houses disagree, the President may summon a joint sitting under Article 108, an actual combined vote of both Houses' members, before either House's version can prevail. A state Legislative Council has no such protection. Its only leverage is delay, roughly three months on the first pass and one month on the second, after which the Assembly's will prevails automatically and unilaterally. A Council can slow a Bill by about four months; it can never actually stop one.

Money Bills: the same Lok Sabha-Rajya Sabha asymmetry, replayed at state level

A Money Bill cannot be introduced in a Legislative Council at all (Article 198(1)); it must originate in the Assembly. Once the Assembly passes it, the Bill goes to the Council, which has exactly 14 days from receipt to return it with recommendations. The Assembly may accept or reject any or all of those recommendations; if it accepts none, the Bill is deemed passed in its original Assembly form; if the Council fails to return it within the 14 days, it is deemed passed exactly as sent. This is a direct structural copy of the Rajya Sabha's own 14-day Money Bill window under Article 109.

Article 199 defines a Money Bill for a state using the same closed list Article 110 uses for Parliament: the imposition, abolition or alteration of a tax; regulation of state borrowing; custody of the Consolidated or Contingency Fund and payments into or out of it; appropriation from the Consolidated Fund; declaring expenditure as charged; receipt of money on account of the Fund or the public account; and anything incidental to these. As at the Union level, a Bill is not a Money Bill merely because it imposes a fine, a fee for services, or a local tax, and if any question arises whether a Bill is a Money Bill, the Speaker's decision is final (Article 199(3)), the exact mirror of the Lok Sabha Speaker's Article 110(3) power. A related provision, Article 207, requires the Governor's prior recommendation before any Bill or amendment dealing with these financial matters can even be introduced or moved, and bars such a Bill from the Council entirely, much as Article 117 does for Parliament.

Privileges of state legislators (Article 194)

Article 194 gives members of a State Legislature freedom of speech in the House, subject to the Constitution and to the House's own rules and standing orders, and immunises them from any court proceeding over anything said or any vote cast in the Legislature or its committees; the same immunity protects anyone responsible for publishing a House's reports, papers, votes or proceedings under its authority. Beyond these two express guarantees, Article 194(3) leaves "other" privileges to be defined by the Legislature's own law, and until such a law is made, those privileges are whatever that House, its members and its committees held immediately before the commencement of section 26 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. This is worth noting precisely because it corrects a genuine, widely repeated myth: before 1978, both Article 194(3) for the states and the equivalent Article 105(3) for Parliament pegged undefined privileges to those of the British House of Commons. The 44th Amendment removed that reference from both articles at the same time, so today neither a state Legislature nor Parliament derives any privilege from the House of Commons; both are entirely self-referential. A statement claiming state legislative privileges are still tied to the House of Commons is wrong for exactly the same reason the equivalent claim about Parliament is wrong.

Quick revision points

• Article 168: six states currently bicameral: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh. Madhya Pradesh's 1956 provision and Tamil Nadu's 2010 Act were never notified into force.
• Article 169: a Council is created or abolished by an ordinary Parliament law, but only after the Assembly passes a special-majority resolution (majority of total membership, two-thirds present and voting). Not a constitutional amendment. Unlike the Rajya Sabha, which can never be abolished.
• Article 170: Assembly strength is 60 to 500, directly elected.
• Article 171: Council strength is capped at one-third of the Assembly, minimum 40; composition is 1/3 local bodies, 1/12 graduates, 1/12 teachers, 1/3 MLA-elected, 1/6 Governor-nominated.
• Article 172: Assembly term is five years; the Council is permanent, with one-third retiring every second year, like the Rajya Sabha.
• Articles 178-180: Assembly Speaker mirrors the Lok Sabha Speaker almost exactly, including the 14-day-notice removal rule and continuing in office until just before the next Assembly's first meeting.
• Article 182: unlike the Rajya Sabha, whose Chairman is the Vice President ex officio, a Legislative Council elects its own Chairman from among its members.
• Article 197: the Council's real weakness. It can delay an ordinary Bill by roughly three months, then one more month on a second pass, after which the Assembly's version is deemed passed automatically, no joint sitting required. The Rajya Sabha, by contrast, is co-equal on ordinary Bills and can only be overridden through an actual joint sitting under Article 108.
• Articles 198-199: Money Bills cannot originate in or be blocked by the Council; it gets 14 days to recommend, exactly like the Rajya Sabha's Article 109 window, and the Speaker's certification of a Money Bill is final.
• Article 194: privileges mirror Parliament's Article 105 closely; since the 44th Amendment, neither traces its undefined privileges to the House of Commons.

Read every statement in this chapter for which exact number or clause it is testing, three months versus one month, 14 days versus six months, one-third versus one-sixth, since that is almost always where the real distinction, and the trap, lives.